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Critical Comments on the Sensorimotor 
Approach to Consciousness 
Dr. Gabriel Jucá de Hollanda 
Abstract- Cognitive neuroscience and contemporary 
physicalist philosophies of mind typically hold the view that 
minds somehow reduce to brain activity. This is achieved 
through representations that evolved to map reality and are 
subjected to computational activity. The received view has 
been criticized mostly through thought experiments that rely 
on the notion of qualia, but philosopher Alva Noë follows a 
different approach, called the “sensorimotor theory”. Unlike 
the orthodoxy, Noë argues that our minds are not inside our 
bodies; they are better seen as a dynamic process of 
embodied cognition. This means mental activity emerges from 
our engagement with the world around us. Noë’s thesis is 
grounded on original arguments that are both empirical and 
philosophical in nature. 
Keywords: neuroscience, representation, perception. 
I. Introduction 
ognitive neuroscience is the discipline that 
merges two influential ideas:1) The mind is an 
information-processing engine that builds 
representations of the world and 2) The brain is the 
locus of all mental activity. Scientists in this field expect 
to obtain a comprehensive account of our cognitive 
capacities through the use of imaging techniques such 
as PET (positron emission tomography) and fMRI 
(functional magnetic resonance imaging). The idea is to 
take advantage of such resources in order to 
understand how the brain implements mental functions. 
The brain is seen as hosting a kind of mapping of reality 
that is continually updated and elaborated through 
computation and external input. Put another way, the 
brain is a kind of biological computer.1 The relevant 
computations are operations that relate representations. 
As a representational engine, it (very roughly) correlates 
sets – the representing set is causally and reliably 
correlated with the represented one. This allows an 
organism to cope with the represented set (the 
environment).2 Patricia Churchland puts this idea thus: 
“Brains are buffers against environmental stress and 
variability.”3
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 Higher organisms are equipped with brains 
because    evolution    has   exploited    the   advantages 
                                                            
1 BROOK & MANDIK, 2004. 
2 Origins of objectivity (BURGE 2010), p. 9. Burge believes this is not a 
correct account of representation, but in any case it is the one 
assumed by cognitive neuroscience 
3 Brain-wise: Studies in neurophilosophy (CHURCHLAND 2002), p. 274. 
conferred by predicting and planning for future events 
that are biologically meaningful.4
One of the strengths of cognitive neuroscience 
is its ability to empirically justify its claims about the 
representational nature of the mind. Experiments 
concerning how rats navigate a maze strongly suggest 
capacities that cannot be explained by conditioning 
alone. Similar conclusions can be drawn from 
experiments that test the cognitive abilities of ravens.
  
5 
These hypotheses are strengthened by a sense of 
continuity with the behavior of “lesser” organisms that 
nonetheless possess analogous skills. Even the humble 
jumping spider would seem to exhibit representational 
abilities (more specifically, it is alleged to represent 
spatial relations when hunting).6
It is thought thateach and every human 
cognitive ability, understood abstractly or 
psychologically, has a correlate in neurophysiology. 
Philosophers of mind tend to be especially interested in 
the so-called NCCs (neural correlates of consciousness) 
and their potential to shed light on the nature of 
conscious phenomena, such as sensory perception and 
voluntary action. Fortunately for its proponents, among 
whom one finds many scientifically-minded 
philosophers, the search for NCCs has led to testable 
and predictive theories of phenomena such as visual 
perception, and this seems to vindicate the framework 
within which the issues are defined and dealt with.
 Thus, representation 
appears to be widespread in biological systems. 
7
Philosopher AlvaNoë, a professor at The City 
University of New York, says the whole conception 
described above is, despite all its apparent success, 
overhyped. Indeed, he says it is overhyped to the point 
of being presented to audiences worldwide as a 
stunning novelty, when it has in fact held educated 
people in thrall for decades. In his latest book, Out of our 
heads: why you are not your brain, and other lessons 
from the biology of consciousness, Noë claims 
mainstream cognitive neuroscience has not and cannot 
achieve its goals, for it rests on false assumptions, some 
of which are philosophical in nature (pp. 5-7; 98-99).He 
argues firstly that it is misleading to see biological minds 
as information processors; secondly (and most 
  
                                                            
4 Ibidem. 
5 Idem, pp. 87, 276-277. 
6 BURGE 2010, pp. 514-517. 
7 The cognitive neuroscience of consciousness(DEHAENE & 
NACCACHE 2001) 
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importantly), that our minds are not located within our 
bodies, as the search for NCCs implies. Mental activity 
is rather a holistic process that extends to the 
organism’s environment. Higher animals are not 
conscious and intelligent due to the possession of a 
map that passively and intellectually represents the 
world. Their consciousness, like most of their mental 
faculties, interacts dynamically with the world. This 
brings us to Noë’s main point: People cannot be 
identified with their brains (p.24). Brain activity can only 
give rise to a mind when situated in a biological and 
cultural context of action and skills. It is high time we 
gave up the idea that neurological activity per se is 
sufficient for consciousness, which seems to imply the 
absurdity of consciousness in a petri dish (p.12). 
At this point, readers may have noted how 
much Noë owes to American psychologist James 
Jerome Gibson. As Noë acknowledges, Gibson’s 
innovative work pioneered an approach that matches 
minds to their ecological habitats.8  Perception-
endowed creatures have a viewpoint due to their ability 
to match sense information to the possibility of action. 
Consider how this relates to the meanings we grasp in 
things around us: E. Bruce Goldstein says that 
someone’s initial “reaction to a flight of stairs may, in 
fact, be ‘here is a way to go up’rather than ‘here is a 
series of surfaces’.” 9 Gibson first had the idea after 
noticing that contemporary studies in depth perception 
lacked realistic considerations about the perceiver’s 
environment.10 Unfortunately, he was never able to 
present much empirical data to support his 
hypothesis.11
So let us look first at the negative arguments 
Noë advances. Those whose sympathies lie with 
mainstream cognitive neuroscience might think brain 
scan technology gives us a clear-cut picture of cognitive 
activities in the brain. Not quite, says Noë. The definition 
of a baseline relative to which one can detect neural 
correlates of cognition is problematic. For starters, the 
brain is never at rest,and comparing the baseline with 
the target activity involves the assumption that there are 
no feedback mechanisms from the latter to the former. 
Given the fact that there are indeed such loops in certain 
brain systems, one must not jump to conclusions about 
brain imaging data (pp.20-22). Furthermore, brain scans 
cannot at present tell us how metabolic activity relates to 
the mental goings-on of patients in persistent vegetative 
state. One might think that reduced brain metabolism 
explains impaired mental functions in vegetative 
patients; astonishingly, though, “it would appear that 
global metabolic levels remain low even after full 
 Noë’s work can be seen, then, as an 
attempt to bridge this gap. 
                                                            
8 Action in perception (NOË 2004), pp. 20-21. 
9 The ecology of J. J. Gibson’s perception (GOLDSTEIN 1981), p. 193. 
10 Idem, p. 191. 
11 Idem, p. 194. 
recovery” (p.18). The upshot is that we ought not to get 
carried away with alleged discoveries of NCCs by 
cognitive neuroscientists. It is just not about looking and 
observing what is going on. 
Another point against the identification of 
conscious phenomena with NCCs has to do with neural 
plasticity. The view that the mind is a set of dedicated 
information-processing modules predicts the existence 
of specialized systems for each sensory modality, and is 
supported by the apparent discovery of an area that 
represents faces specifically (p.110-117). Nonetheless, 
Noë mentions (pp.53-56) experiments with ferrets where 
the animals’ eyes are wired up to brain structures 
normally used in hearing. If there were something in the 
visual cortex that made experiences visual, and 
something else in the auditory parts making experiences 
auditory, the ferrets would “hear with their eyes” (p.55). 
But this is not the case. The ferrets see with their 
supposed “auditory brains”. This implies a malleable 
connection between brain structures and the qualitative 
character of experiences. For this reason, itis ill-advised 
to equate a given conscious phenomenon with activity in 
this or that part of the brain. The structure of the 
“auditory brain” is not the key here; what explains its role 
in the experience is its connection to a certain source of 
information. Moreover, it has been shown that depriving 
cats of sight during a given period in their infancy 
destroys their ability to see. Experimental data strongly 
suggests, then, that “sensory stimulation produces the 
very connectedness and function that in turn make 
normal consciousness possible” (p.49). Here is a good 
reason for considering the possibility that the visual 
character of experience is determined by interaction with 
the environment, and not just by activity in this or that 
brain structure. 
So how does Noë convert the insights above 
into a theory that actually explains the data? In a 
nutshell, he claims that perceptual experience happens 
when organisms apply their mastery of the laws of 
sensorimotor contingencies (pp.47-65). Put another 
way, conscious beings have subjectivity in virtue of their 
use of special skills which constitute a kind of non-
propositional knowledge. They can skillfully exploit 
certain potentialities to get information from the 
environment. Creatures that are capable of seeing, for 
example, have mastered the lawful dependence relation 
between their actions and visual input, a relation 
determined by the character of their visual apparatus. As 
Noë says, “how things look depends, in subtle and fine-
grained ways, on what you do.  Approach an object and 
it looms in your visual field. Now turn away: it leaves 
your field of view” (p. 60). Furthermore, conscious 
animals tacitly understand the sensorimotor 
contingencies determined by visible objects and 
attributes such as shape, color and size. The visual 
character of a shape, for example, is the set of all 
potential distortions that occur when a given object is 
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moved relative to the subject, and vice-versa. As Noë 
has written elsewhere12 , “to see a spatial feature such 
as the size or the shape of an object is to explore the 
way the look of the object varies as we move.” Visually 
perceived objects possess appearance properties (that 
is, they have relational properties that boil down to how 
they look from the viewer’s position) that vary according 
to the perceiver’s position. They seem subjective to 
philosophers precisely because they are viewpoint-
dependent; in other words, they are “relations between 
objects and their environment.”13 Unsurprisingly, Noë 
sees this is a way of explaining qualia away. 
Appearance properties should not be seen as intriguing 
mental objects of some kind; they are nothing but 
relations things have objectively. 14In any case, visual 
perception draws its contents from action. Suppose you 
see a circular object, such as a plate, from an angle that 
makes it look elliptical. The actual shape of the object is 
grasped when we understand how the plates’ 
appearance (a relational property like those just 
described) will change as we move around it.15 One 
needs to know how to interact with the environment to 
perceive the shape in question. Location can be 
handled analogously. Experience something as off to 
the left means knowing that pointing to it would involve 
the moment of a hand and arm to the left, knowing that 
looking at it would involve turning one’s head in the 
same direction, and so on.  Mastering the range of 
actions that bring us into contact with the object gives 
rise to perception of it.Similarly, the sensation of color is 
determined by the way a surface changes the light when 
it moves relative to the observer or light sources. The 
structure of such changes is lawful, and integrating the 
activities that rely on knowledge of the relevant laws in 
planning, reasoning and speech is experiencing color. 
At this point, the reader may have noticed that one need 
not posit anything over and above a physical base to 
commit to the theory. Therefore, Noë’s approach has 
the major advantage of fitting physicalism (even if there 
is no local supervenience on neurophysiological activity, 
it appears that there is global supervenience relative to 
the whole environment where the organism is 
embedded16
                                                            
12 Action in perception, p. 84. 
13 Idem, p. 83. 
14 Idem, pp. 79-84. 
15 Ibidem. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) while doing justice to intuitions that are 
contrary to reductionism. This is reassuring because so 
much evidence suggests that physicalism is a much 
better-behaved metaphysics than the dualist alternative. 
At present there is no better way of minimizing 
conceptual and empirical problems.17
The remaining sensory modalities are 
individuated by sets of laws that are unique to each of 
them. Consider auditory sensorimotor contingencies: 
eye movements or blinks make no difference to them, 
whereas head rotations do (when we move our heads 
  
Noë uses perceptual plasticity, the 
phenomenon revealed by the ferret experiments above, 
to positively support his thesis.  The argument involves 
the introduction of a device by engineer and 
psychologist Paul Bach-y-Rita to help the visually 
challenged, or as Noë rather bluntly puts it, “enable 
blind people to see (p. 56).”Bach-y-Rita exploited the 
idea that “the eyes are a channel for getting information 
to the nervous system” to invent a substitute that can 
provide the same kind stimulus. A camera was 
connected to vibrators on the subjects’ thighs or 
abdomen. Visual input from the camera caused the 
vibrators to stimulate the subject’s skin. So a given 
pattern of visual information would correlate with a 
specific pattern of vibration. These vibrations, according 
to Noë, generate activity in the same brain structure (the 
somatosensory cortex) that coordinates ordinary 
vibrations. Yet, the result is not a new way of “touching 
with a camera” (again, note the analogy with the ferret 
experiment); it is a renewed ability to see. Bach-y-Rita’s 
subjects could discriminate the features of objects in a 
fair distance just like a seeing person would. 
Interestingly, they were able to coordinate their 
movements well enough to hit a Ping-Pong ball. All it 
took was a few hours of getting used to the device (it 
would seem it is not more widespread as a therapeutic 
device because of its sheer size) (pp. 56-57).  
So here is the main lesson to be drawn: we 
need plasticity to explain the sensory substitution 
phenomenon. This is so because there is not enough 
time for the “full-grown and therefore relatively 
nonplastic adults” to rewire their brains (p. 58). So there 
is nothing intrinsic in the supposed “touch area of the 
brain” that makes it process and represent tactile 
stimuli. All it takes for it to become a vision enabler is 
getting visual stimuli. This suggests brain structures are 
not the key to understand perception, visual or 
otherwise. Bach-y-Rita’s device can make blind people 
see because it enables them to adjust their actions to 
stimuli just like a seeing person. Stimulation changes 
very specifically as the subject moves around. 
Occlusion cuts off the subject from stimuli and 
approaching an object results in improved resolution. 
Turning the camera off means contact with distant 
things ends. When the subject manages to master the 
skills that enable them to interact with the world like a 
“normal” person does, he sees again (pp. 63-64). 
                                                            
17  See HOLLANDA 2011. 
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16 As philosopher David Chalmers (1996, p. 33-34) writes, “B-
properties supervene locally on A-properties if the A-properties of an 
individual determine the B-properties of that individual” while “B-
properties supervene globally on A-properties, by contrast, if the A-
facts about the entire world determine the B-facts: that is, if there are 
no two possible worlds identical with respect to their A-properties, but 
differing with respect to their A-properties”. I gather the individual that 
is relevant to our consideration is the brain, while the whole organism 
and its acting in a given environment plays the role of a “world”.
towards a sound source, we change the amplitude of 
the input). 18   By the same token, tactile information is 
not obtained from a viewpoint, and is not dependent on 
light sources. The relevant transformations depend on 
contact with the objects, that is, a particular use of our 
bodies. Touching allows us to perceive an object’s 
shape when we have a sense of the movements 
“allowed by the object’s contours” (p.61). This is another 
Gibson-inspired insight; the latter’s work described how 
sensations of touch arise from “an observer who actively 
explores the surfaces of objects”.19
What is the brain’s role in all this? According to 
Noë, the brain is a key element in consciousness 
because it “coordinates our dealings with the 
environment” (p.65). Without an environment to ground 
such dealings, though, there is no interaction and 
therefore no experience. Perception is like dancing with 
a partner; when dancing, one moves this or that way 
because the partner has made a given movement. 
Brains are analogously connected to their environment. 
This implies the falsity of the neuroscientific account of a 
brain that generates consciousness through 
representational activity alone. Indeed, it is misleading to 
see the mind as a set of representations. The world is its 
own model; we do not need a map of it inside our heads 
because the environment is accessible to those that 
have the sensory motor skills described above 
(p.141).Again, this is a Gibsonian claim. Gibson argued 
that the world in which we live in provides information 
that is readily available. Perception typically requires no 
elaborate computations or symbol manipulations in 
addition to input (think of the problem – here seen as a 
pseudo-problem – of figuring out distances and depth 
from the retinal image).
  
20 This claim is supported by 
change blindness data. The relevant experiments show 
that we fail to perceive major changes in our visual 
environment when not attending to the fleeting elements 
themselves. Noë concludes that “it is untrue that we 
enjoy detailed, stable internal depictions of the external 
world” (p.142). Consequently, the search for NCCs 
pursued by cognitive neuroscientists is futile. The target 
representations are simply not there! It is about time we 
realized that instead of neural representations doing the 
job on their own, “it is the world itself, all around, that 
fixes the character of conscious experience” (p. 142). 
Gibson’s admittedly radical framework21
Unsurprisingly, there are some gaps in Noë’s 
recent writings on perception. Those familiar with his 
earlier work
 is thus 
vindicated. 
22
                                                            
18 See A sensorimotor account of vision and visual consciousness 
(O’Regan e Noë 2001), p. 941.  
19 GOLDSTEIN 1981, p. 193 
20 Ibidem. 
21 Ibidem. 
22See, for example, O’REGAN &  NOË, 2001. 
  will probably notice Noë fails to mention 
how his view can unify a range of phenomena from 
blindsight to visual agnosia to color vision (although 
prosthetic perception and perceptual stability are 
mentioned). This is a rather curious omission, since 
discussing the phenomena above would considerably 
strengthen the case for a sensorimotor approach. 
Another gap is the vagueness inherent to saying that the 
brain “coordinates our dealings with the environment” 
and leaving it at that. One would obviously like to know 
what this means exactly. Trivially, it cannot in this context 
mean that the brain is a representational engine, so 
what is it a nexus of? Further weaknesses can be found 
in the negative arguments against the mainstream view. 
It is certainly interesting to learn about the shortcomings 
of brain scanning techniques, but is it not premature to 
criticize neuroscience for not being able to see directly 
what is going on? Science, after all, does not necessarily 
depend on direct observations. It has been argued 
(rather persuasively, in my view) that direct observation 
is not even the typical situation in obtaining data for 
science.23  Nobody has ever directly observed a 
neutrino, for example, but that does not make neutrino 
research less credible. It is taken quite seriously in part 
because we can infer the target phenomenon through 
its effects on things we can straightforwardly perceive 
(particle scientists can perceive bubble chamber 
photographs, for example). By the same token, 
cognitive neuroscientists can make inferences about 
representational activity in nervous systems through a 
range of techniques whose power is independently 
corroborated (but not – and this is crucial to Noë’s 
criticism – conceptually neutral). The fact that these 
observations are theory-laden also shows very little, 
unless one is prepared to cast much of science in a 
suspicious light.In any case, cognitive neuroscientists 
can complement brain imaging evidence with 
novelexperimental predictions, and this has been 
done.24  Another weakness on the book is Noë’s 
portrayal of neuroscience as a science of picture-like 
representations (p.140). The mainstream view does not 
need mental snapshots. It can use vector coding, for 
example, to explain representation in a more abstract 
way.25 Some philosophers sympathetic to the 
mainstream view are also aware that mental activity 
needs a wider environment that provides a context. 
Christopher Hill’s account, for example, claims that 
representational content is determined by interaction 
with the environment in an evolutionary context.26
                                                            
23  See Saving the phenomena (BOGEN & WOODWARD 2001). 
24 DEHAENE & NACACCHE, 2001, p. 18-22. 
25 Vector coding is a technique that analyses representation in a 
quantitative, abstract way. It has been applied to face perception, the 
sense of taste and color vision, for example. It is thought that faces 
can be represented by vectors that stand for the relevant features, 
such as distance between the eyes and nose width. See 
CHURCHLAND 2002, p. 290-302. 
HILL, 2009, p. 148-153. 
 This 
means Hill is quite ready to concede that it is impossible 
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26
to have consciousness in a petri dish (there is no 
straightforward supervenience of mental properties on 
neurological goings-on), while holding a view where 
internal representations are key. Readers are also 
advised to compare Noë’s bold perspective with that of 
Tyler Burge, who also develops a theory of perception 
that is critical of the brain-centered approach and is 
claimed to be biologically realistic. Unlike Noë, however, 
Burge goes to great lengths to nurture the idea that the 
mind is representational in nature.27
What is the main lesson to be drawn here? The 
main point in favor of Noë’s view (as expressed in Out of 
our heads) is its concern with problems that are internal 
to the relevant science, but highly engaging to 
philosophers at the same time. Notions such as qualia 
and zombies have often been used in a way that is 
hardly constructive; it is arguably futile to look for a 
positive role they can play in formulating theories. Little 
is offered in return for the rejection of physicalism urged 
by writers such as David Chalmers or John Searle. More 
specifically, critics of physicalism owe other researchers 
a progressive research program that predicts new 
phenomena and unifies known but apparently unrelated 
facts.
  
28 Noë, however, manages to present an intriguing 
alternative to the mainstream theory that is built with 
materials outside the box of metaphysical thought 
experiments, qualia and zombies. This is accomplished 
without losing sight of typical philosophical 
preoccupations such as the nature of appearances and 
mental content. This is important for philosophy, since 
such problems are part of its tradition and cannot 
straightforwardly be taken over by purely scientific 
theories. Noë’s work, then, can be seen as a benchmark 
in terms of highlighting philosophical insights.29
1. BOGEN, James & WOODWARD, James. Saving the 
phenomena. The philosophical review (1988). 97:3.  
 More 
philosophers should emulate this approach. One hopes 
more philosophers will exploit the theoretical 
opportunities in the coming clash of reductionist 
approaches versus sensorimotor ones.  
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